

Survivability Design Principles for Enhanced Concept Generation and Evaluation

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
- Introduction
 - Definition of Survivability
 - Survivability Design Principles
- Methodological Overview
 - Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) for Survivability
 - Case Application: Satellite Radar
- Synthesis



Introduction



Recent Events




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Definition of Survivability

<u>Ability of a system to minimize the impact of finite-duration disturbances on value delivery</u> through (I) the reduction of the likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance, (II) the satisfaction of a minimally acceptable level of value delivery during and after a disturbance, and/or (III) a timely recovery





Empirical Generation of Survivability Design Principles

- 1. Deduce initial design principles from system-disturbance framework, exploratory interviews, and literature (12 design principles)
- 2. Select operational systems with survivability requirements






A-10A "Warthog"

UH-60A Blackhawk



F-16C Fighting Falcon



Iridium Network

3. Trace design specifications of systems to design principles

| | | Design Principles | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------|----------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------------|--------|
| | | | | Ту | be I | | | Type II | | | | Тур | e III |
| A-10A: Sample Survivability Features | | prevention | mobility | concealment | deterrence | preemption | avoidance | hardness | evolution | redundancy | diversity | replacement | repair |
| ē | redundant primary structure | | | | | | | | | Х | | | |
| t I | dual vertical stabilizers to shield heat exhaust | | | Х | | | | | | | ma | rgin | |
| Ĭ | long low-set wings (flight possible even if missing 1/2 wing) | | | | | | | | | Х | | | |
| str | interchangeable engines, landing hear, and vertical stabilizers | | | | | | | | | | | | Х |

4. Revise set to reflect empirical observation (17 design principles)


Survivability Design Principles

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Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative


RI

| | | Type I (Reduce Susceptibility) | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1.1 | prevention | suppression of a future or potential future disturbance | | | | | | |
| 1.2 | mobility | relocation to avoid detection by an external change agent | | | | | | |
| 1.3 | concealment | reduction of the visibility of a system from an external change agent | | | | | | |
| 1.4 | deterrence | dissuasion of a rational external change agent from committing a disturbance | | | | | | |
| 1.5 | preemption | suppression of an imminent disturbance | | | | | | |
| 1.6 | avoidance | maneuverability away from an ongoing disturbance | | | | | | |
| | Type II (Reduce Vulnerability) | | | | | | | |
| 2.1 | hardness | resistance of a system to deformation | | | | | | |
| 2.2 | redundancy | duplication of critical system functions to increase reliability | | | | | | |
| 2.3 | margin | allowance of extra capability for maintaining value delivery despite losses | | | | | | |
| 2.4 | heterogeneity | variation in system elements to mitigate homogeneous disturbances | | | | | | |
| 2.5 | distribution | separation of critical system elements to mitigate local disturbances | | | | | | |
| 2.6 | failure mode reduction | elimination of system hazards through intrinsic design: substitution, simplification, decoupling, and reduction of hazardous materials | | | | | | |
| 2.7 | fail-safe | prevention or delay of degradation via physics of incipient failure | | | | | | |
| 2.8 | evolution | alteration of system elements to reduce disturbance effectiveness | | | | | | |
| 2.9 | containment | isolation or minimization of the propagation of failure | | | | | | |
| | | Type III (Enhance Resilience) | | | | | | |
| 3.1 | replacement | substitution of system elements to improve value delivery | | | | | | |
| 3.2 | repair | restoration of system to improve value delivery | | | | | | |





Methodological Overview





Phases of MATE for Survivability

- 1. Elicit Value Proposition Identify mission statement and quantify decisionmaker needs during nominal and emergency states.
- 2. Generate Concepts Formulate concepts that address decision-maker needs.
- 3. Characterize Disturbance Environment Develop concept-neutral models of disturbances in operational environment of proposed systems.
- **4. Apply Survivability Principles** Incorporate susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, and resilience enhancement strategies into design vector.
- 5. Model Baseline System Performance Model and simulate cost and performance of design alternatives to gain an understanding of how decision-maker needs are met in a nominal operational environment.
- 6. Model Impact of Disturbances on Lifecycle Performance Model and simulate performance of design alternatives across a representative sample of disturbance encounters to gain an understanding of how decision-maker needs are met in perturbed environments.
- 7. Apply Survivability Metrics Compute time-weighted utility loss and threshold availability for each design alternative as summary statistics for system performance across representative operational lives.
- 8. Explore Tradespace Perform integrated cost, utility, and survivability trades across design space to identify promising alternatives for more detailed analysis.

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
Case Application: Satellite Radar


Critical issue in national security space

- Unique all-weather surveillance capability
- Opportunity for impact given ongoing studies
- Rich multi-dimensional tradespace

Unit-of-analysis: SR architecture

- Radar payload
- Constellation of satellites
- Communications network





(CBO 2007)

Case Application Goal

To assess potential **satellite radar** architectures for providing the United States Military a global, all-weather, on-demand capability to **track moving ground targets**; supporting tactical military operations; maximizing costeffectiveness; and **surviving disturbances** in the natural space environment.

Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initial

Phase 2: Generate Concepts

| | | | ATTRIBUTES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|--|------------------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|
| | Design Value M | lanning | | | | | | issio | on | | | | | Pr | ograr | nmat | | |
| | Design Value M | | | | Trac | king |) | | | In | nagi | ng | | Сс | ost | Sche | edule | |
| | Matrix establishes traceability between <u>value-</u> <u>space</u> and <u>design-space</u> | | num Target RCS | Detectable Velocity | ber of Target Boxes | Target Acquisition Time | et Track Life | Tracking Latency | Resolution (Proxy) | Targets per Pass | Field of Regard | Revisit Frequency | Imaging Latency | Baseline Cost | al Costs (Era) | line Schedule | al Schedule (Era) | Total Impact |
| | Variable Name | Definition Range | Minimum | Min. | Number | | Target [.] | Track | Reso | Targe | Field | Revis | Imag | Base | Actual | Baseline | Actual | - |
| | Peak Transmit Power | 1.5 10 20 [KW] | 9 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 96 |
| | Radar Bandwidth | .5 1 2 [GHz] | 9 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 66 |
| s | Radar Frequency | X UHF | 9 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 66 |
| Ш | Physical Antenna Area | 10 40 100 200 [m^2] | 9 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 97 |
| ABL | Receiver Sats per Tx Sat | 012345 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 79 |
| RI/ | Antenna Type | Mechanical vs. AESA | 9 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 99 |
| AF | Satellite Altitude | 800 1200 1500 [km] | 9 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 85 |
| Z | Constellation Type | 8 Walker IDs | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 73 |
| Ū | Comm. Downlink | Relay vs. Downlink | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 48 |
| ES | Tactical Downlink | Yes vs. No | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 51 |
| Ы | Processing | Space vs. Ground | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 44 |
| | Maneuver Package | 1x, 2x, 4x | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 27 |
| | Tugable | Yes vs. No | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 45 |
| | Constellation Option | none, long-lead, spare | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 36 |
| | Total | | 65 | 64 | 42 | 39 | 30 | 33 | 66 | 58 | 62 | 23 | 33 | 106 | 100 | 88 | 100 | |

Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative

RI

Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative Phase 3: Characterize Disturbance Environment

Enumerate disturbances


- Orbital debris
- Signal attenuation

Gather data on disturbance magnitude and occurrence


- NASA ORDEM2000 debris model
 - Space Surveillance Network
 - Haystack and Haystack radar data
 - Goldstone radar data
 - Long-Duration Exposure Facility
 - Hubble Telescope array impact data
 - Space Shuttle impact data
 - Mir impact data

Develop system-independent models of disturbance environment

Spatial Density Debris Spatial Density (800 km circular, i=42.6°)



Average Orbital Velocity



heric drag fluctuations

in target characteristics

eteorites / debris

attenuation

x radiation

charging

actical ground node

of relay backbone

Survivability Variable Mapping Matrix establishes traceability between <u>environment</u> and <u>design-space</u>

| | design principles | concept enhancements | design variables (units) | atmospł | arc disc | high-flu | microme | signal a | change | failure o | loss of t |
|----------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------|-----------|-----------|
| | prevention | reduce exposed s/c area | antenna area (m^2) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | mobility | | | | | | | | | | |
| _ | concealment | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | deterrence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Σ | preemption | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | s/c maneuvering | ΔV (m/s) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | avoidance | s/e maneuvering | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | ground receiver maneuverability | mobile receiver | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | hardness | radiation-hardened electronics | hardening (cal/cm ²) | 0 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | naruness | bumper shielding | shield thickness (mm) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | duplicate critical s/c functions | bus redundancy | 0 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | redundancy | on-orbit satellite spares | extra s/c per orbital plan | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | multiple ground receivers | ground infrastructure level | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| | | over-design power generation | peak transmit power (kW) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | over-design link budget | assumed signal loss (dB) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | margin | over-design propulsion system | ΔV (m/s) | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | excess on-board data storage | s/c data capacity (gbits) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| = | | excess constellation capacity | number of satellites | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Type | | interface with airborne assets | tactical downlink | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Ĥ | heterogeneity | multiple communication paths | communications downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | | multiple communication paths | tactical downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | distribution | spatial separation of spacecraft | orbital altitude (km) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | distribution | spatial separation of s/c orbits | number of planes | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | failure mode reduction | reduce s/c complexity | bus redundancy | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | fail-safe | autonomous operations | autonomous control | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| | | flexible sensing operations | antenna type | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | evolution | | radar bandwidth (GHz) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | retraction of s/c appendages | reconfigurable | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | containment | s/c fault monitoring and response | autonomous control | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ≡ | replacement | rapid reconstitution | constellation spares | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| \vdash | repair | on-orbit-servicing | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

pheric drag fluctuations

in target characteristics

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Ittenuation

x radiation

charging

of relay backbone tactical ground node

Survivability Variable Mapping Matrix establishes traceability between <u>environment</u> and <u>design-space</u>

| | design principles | concept enhancements | design variables (units) | atmosp | arc disc | high-flu | microm | signal a | change | failure (| loss of |
|----------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|----------|----------|--------|----------|--------|-----------|---------|
| | prevention | reduce exposed s/c area | antenna area (m^2) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | mobility | | | | | | | | | | |
| | concealment | | | | | | | | | | |
| l e | deterrence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | preemption | | | | | | | | | | |
| · · | | s/c maneuvering | ΔV (m/s) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | avoidance | s/c maneuvering | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | ground receiver maneuverability | mobile receiver | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | hardness | radiation-hardened electronics | hardening (cal/cm^2) | 0 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | naiuness | bumper shielding | shield thickness (mm) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | duplicate critical s/c functions | bus redundancy | 0 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | redundancy | on-orbit satellite spares | extra s/c per orbital plan | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | multiple ground receivers | ground infrastructure level | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| | | over-design power generation | peak transmit power (kW) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | over-design link budget | assumed signal loss (dB) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | margin | over-design propulsion system | ΔV (m/s) | 3 | 0 | З | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | excess on-board data storage | s/c data capacity (gbits) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| = | | excess constellation capacity | number of satellites | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Type II | | interface with airborne assets | tactical downlink | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Γ | heterogeneity | multiple communication paths | communications downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | | | tactical downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | distribution | spatial separation of spacecraft | orbital altitude (km) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | spatial separation of s/c orbits | number of planes | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | failure mode reduction | reduce s/c complexity | bus redundancy | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | fail-safe | autonomous operations | autonomous control | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| | | flexible sensing operations | antenna type | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | evolution | • | radar bandwidth (GHz) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | retraction of s/c appendages | reconfigurable | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | containment | s/c fault monitoring and response | autonomous control | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ≡ | replacement | rapid reconstitution | constellation spares | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| \vdash | repair | on-orbit-servicing | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

pheric drag fluctuations

in target characteristics

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x radiation

charging

of relay backbone tactical ground node

Survivability Variable Mapping Matrix establishes traceability between <u>environment</u> and <u>design-space</u>

| | design principles | concept enhancements | design variables (units) | atmosp | arc dise | high-flu | micron | signal a | change | failure | loss of |
|----------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|----------|----------|--------|----------|--------|---------|---------|
| | prevention | reduce exposed s/c area | antenna area (m^2) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | mobility | | | | | | | | | | |
| _ | concealment | | | | | | | | | | |
| e | deterrence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | preemption | | | | | | | | | | |
| l . | | s/c maneuvering | ΔV (m/s) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | avoidance | s/c maneuvering | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | ground receiver maneuverability | mobile receiver | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | hardness | radiation-hardened electronics | hardening (cal/cm^2) | 0 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | naiuness | bumper shielding | shield thickness (mm) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | duplicate critical s/c functions | bus redundancy | 0 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | redundancy | on-orbit satellite spares | extra s/c per orbital plan | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | multiple ground receivers | ground infrastructure level | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| | | over-design power generation | peak transmit power (kW) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | over-design link budget | assumed signal loss (dB) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | margin | over-design propulsion system | ΔV (m/s) | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | excess on-board data storage | s/c data capacity (gbits) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| = | | excess constellation capacity | number of satellites | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Type II | | interface with airborne assets | tactical downlink | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| ŕ | heterogeneity | multiple communication paths | communications downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | | multiple communication paths | tactical downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | distribution | spatial separation of spacecraft | orbital altitude (km) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | uistribution | spatial separation of s/c orbits | number of planes | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | failure mode reduction | reduce s/c complexity | bus redundancy | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | fail-safe | autonomous operations | autonomous control | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| | | flexible sensing operations | antenna type | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | evolution | liexible sensing operations | radar bandwidth (GHz) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | retraction of s/c appendages | reconfigurable | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | containment | s/c fault monitoring and response | autonomous control | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ξ | replacement | rapid reconstitution | constellation spares | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| \vdash | repair | on-orbit-servicing | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

| finalized | design | vector |
|-----------|----------|--------|
| (r | n = 3888 | |

| Orbit Altitude (km) | |
|---------------------|--|
| 800 | |
| 1500 | |

| Peak Transmit Power (kW) |
|--------------------------|
| 1.5 |
| 10 |
| 20 |

| Walker ID |
|-----------|
| 5/5/1 |
| 9/3/2 |
| 27/3/1 |
| 66/6/5 |

| Radar Bandwidth (MHz) |
|-----------------------|
| 500 |
| 1000 |
| 2000 |

| Antenna Area (m^2) | |
|--------------------|--|
| 10 | |
| 40 | |
| 100 | |

| Comm. Architecture | |
|----------------------|--|
| Direct Downlink Only | |
| Relay Backbone | |

oheric drag fluctuations

Survivability Variable Mapping Matrix establishes traceability between <u>environment</u> and <u>design-space</u>

| L | design principles | concept enhancements | design variables (units) | atmosl | arc dis | high-flı | micron | signal | change | failure | loss of |
|------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|---------|----------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| | prevention | reduce exposed s/c area | antenna area (m^2) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | mobility | | | | | | | | | | |
| _ | concealment | | | | | | | | | | |
| e | deterrence | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | preemption | | | | | | | | | | |
| ' | avoidance | | ΔV (m/s) | 9 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | s/c maneuvering | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | ground receiver maneuverability | mobile receiver | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | h a rd a a a | radiation-hardened electronics | hardening (cal/cm ²) | 0 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | hardness | bumper shielding | shield thickness (mm) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | duplicate critical s/c functions | bus redundancy | 0 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | redundancy | on-orbit satellite spares | extra s/c per orbital plan | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | multiple ground receivers | ground infrastructure level | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| | margin | over-design power generation | peak transmit power (kW) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | over-design link budget | assumed signal loss (dB) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | over-design propulsion system | $\Delta V (m/s)$ | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | excess on-board data storage | s/c data capacity (gbits) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| = | | excess constellation capacity | number of satellites | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Type | | interface with airborne assets | tactical downlink | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Ţ | heterogeneity | | communications downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | ö , | multiple communication paths | tactical downlink | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 9 | 0 | 9 | 3 |
| | distribution | spatial separation of spacecraft | orbital altitude (km) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | | spatial separation of s/c orbits | number of planes | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | failure mode reduction | reduce s/c complexity | bus redundancy | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | fail-safe | autonomous operations | autonomous control | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| | | | antenna type | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| | evolution | flexible sensing operations | radar bandwidth (GHz) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| | | retraction of s/c appendages | reconfigurable | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | containment | s/c fault monitoring and response | autonomous control | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ≡ | replacement | rapid reconstitution | constellation spares | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ē | repair | on-orbit-servicing | s/c servicing interface | 9 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

| 0 | <u>finalized design vector</u> (n=3888) |
|------------------------------|--|
| ode | Orbit Altitude (km) |
| р р | 800 |
| n | 1500 |
| loss of tactical ground node | |
| $\overline{\alpha}$ | Peak Transmit Power (kW) |
| Ę | 1.5 |
| ta | 10 |
| ð | 20 |
| SSC | |
| Ō | Walker ID |
| | 5/5/1 |
| | 9/3/2 |
| | 27/3/1 |

e in target characteristics

neteorites / debris

attenuation

ux radiation

scharging


of relay backbone

| Radar Bandwidth (MHz) | |
|-----------------------|--|
| 500 | |
| 1000 | |
| 2000 | |


66/6/5

| Antenna Area (m^2) | |
|--------------------|--|
| 10 | |
| 40 | |
| 100 | |

| Comm. Architecture | |
|----------------------|--|
| Direct Downlink Only | |
| Relay Backbone | |
| | |



survivability variables





Synthesis






- Survivability definition provides a *solution-generating* and *decision-making* framework, enabling discovery of systems robust to finite-duration disturbances
- Design principles reveal latent survivability trades in baseline design vector
- Design principles inform selection of additive survivability design variables
- Uniting tradespace exploration with survivability analysis generates knowledge that may ultimately lead to better design decisions
- Importance of survivability will grow as critical infrastructures become increasingly large-scale, long-lived, and interdependent



Future Work

- Methodological improvements
 - Parameterize concept-of-operations in design vector
 - Extend scope for systems-of-systems (SoS) engineering
- Apply MATE for Survivability to additional systems for prescriptive insights




power distribution



transportation



water distribution



communications

